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Empreendedorismo social e comercial: iguais, 
diferentes ou ambos?
O empreendedorismo tem sido o motor que vem impelindo uma 
boa parcela do crescimento do setor dos negócios, além de ser a 
força motriz responsável pela rápida expansão desse setor. Neste 
artigo, oferece-se uma análise comparativa do empreendedorismo 
comercial e do social, valendo-se de um modelo analítico pre-
valecente, proveniente da área de empreendedorismo comercial. 
Na análise, destacam-se as principais similaridades e diferenças 
entre essas duas formas de empreendedorismo e apresenta-se 
um arcabouço para uma abordagem mais sistemática e eficaz do 
processo empreendedor. Exploram-se as implicações dessa análise 
de empreendedorismo social tanto para seus praticantes como para 
seus pesquisadores.  
Palavras-chave: empreendedorismo comercial, empreendedorismo  
 
social, similaridades, diferenças.
1. IntroductIon
Social entrepreneurship, or entrepreneurial activity with an embedded so-
cial purpose, has been on the rise in recent decades. Apartial indicator of this 
surge is revealed by the growth in the number of nonprofit organizations, which 
increased 31% between 1987 and 1997 to 1.2 million, exceeding the 26% rate 
of new business formation (The New Nonprofit Almanac and Desk Reference, 
2002). However, the dynamic is even more robust, as other forms of social 
entrepreneurship, beyond that occurring within the nonprofit sector, have also 
flourished in recent years. The recent boom in social entrepreneurial activity 
makes a comparative analysis between commercial and social entrepreneur-
ship timely. Social entrepreneurship is still emerging as an area for academic 
inquiry. Its theoretical underpinnings have not been adequately explored, and 
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the need for contributions to theory and practice are pressing. 
This article aims to open up some avenues of exploration for 
social entrepreneurship theory development and practice by 
presenting an exploratory comparative analysis of the extent to 
which elements applicable to business entrepreneurship, which 
has been more extensively studied, are transferable to social 
entrepreneurship. To a lesser degree, we will also explore the 
reverse applicability or the ways in which insights from social 
entrepreneurship can contribute to a deeper understanding of 
business entrepreneurship. We offer a comparative that identifies 
common and differentiating features between commercial and 
social entrepreneurship. This exploration develops new insights 
about social entrepreneurship and points to opportunities for 
further elaboration by researchers, as well as to practical implica-
tions for social entrepreneurs and funders on how to approach 
social entrepreneurship more systematically and effectively. 
In the next section, we discuss some of the key distinctions 
between social and commercial entrepreneurship as a modest 
step toward the development of a body of theory on social entre-
preneurship. To analyze these theoretical propositions in depth 
and to draw out lessons for managers, we will then set forth one 
prevailing model used to examine commercial entrepreneur-
ship and to explore new ideas that emerge when it is applied 
to social entrepreneurship. The article concludes by presenting 
implications for social enterpreneurial practice and research. 
2. thEorEtIcal consIdEratIons 
Definitions of social entrepreneurship range from broad 
to narrow. In the former, social entrepreneurship refers to 
innovative activity with a social objective in either the for-
-profit sector, such as in social-purpose commercial ventures 
(e.g., Dees & Anderson, 2003; Emerson & Twersky, 1996) or 
in corporate social entrepreneurship (e.g., Austin, Leonard, 
Reficco, & Wei-Skillern, 2004); or in the nonprofit sector, 
or across sectors, such as hybrid structural forms which mix 
for-profit and nonprofit approaches (Dees, 1998). Under the 
narrow definition, social entrepreneurship typically refers to 
the phenomenon of applying business expertise and market-
-based skills in the nonprofit sector such as when nonprofit 
organizations develop innovative approaches to earn income 
(Reis, 1999; Thompson, 2002). Common across all definitions 
of social entrepreneurship is the fact that the underlying drive 
for social entrepreneurship is to create social value, rather than 
personal and shareholder wealth (e.g., Zadek & Thake, 1997), 
and that the activity is characterized by innovation, or the cre-
ation of something new rather than simply the replication of 
existing enterprises or practices. The central driver for social 
entrepreneurship is the social problem being addressed, and the 
particular organizational form a social enterprise takes should 
be a decision based on which format would most effectively 
mobilize the resources needed to address that problem. Thus, 
social entrepreneurship is not defined by legal form, as it can 
be pursued through various vehicles. Indeed, examples of social 
entrepreneurship can be found within or can span the nonprofit, 
business, or governmental sectors. 
We will use this broader conceptualization of social en-
trepreneurship here to offer a comparative analysis with com-
mercial entrepreneurship. We define social entrepreneurship 
as innovative, social value creating activity that can occur 
within or across the nonprofit, business, or government sec-
tors. However, most definitions of social entrepreneurship in 
popular discourse, as well as in the academic literature, focus 
primarily on social entrepreneurship within and across the 
nonprofit and business sectors. To build on previous work and 
for the purposes of this article, we will limit our discussion to 
these two sectors as well. 
To approach the comparative analysis more specifically, we 
offer the following series of theoretical propositions focusing 
on four different variables to guide the comparison: 
● Market failure. One theory behind the existence of social-
-purpose organizations is that they emerge when there is 
social-market failure, i.e., commercial market forces do not 
meet a social need, such as in public goods (Weisbrod, 1975, 
1977) or in contract failure (Nelson & Krashinsky, 1973). 
This is often due to the inability of those needing the services 
to pay for them(1). A problem for the commercial entrepreneur 
is an opportunity for the social entrepreneur. Our proposition 
here is: Market failure will create differing entrepreneurial 
opportunities for social and commercial entrepreneurship. 
● Mission. The fundamental purpose of social entrepreneur-
ship is creating social value for the public good, whereas 
commercial entrepreneurship aims at creating profitable 
operations resulting in private gain. This contrast is, of 
course, overstated. Commercial entrepreneurship does ben-
efit society in the form of new and valuable goods, services, 
and jobs, and can have transformative social impacts. Such 
transformations can even be a driving motivation for some 
commercial entrepreneurs. Nonetheless, the differences in 
purpose and reward are useful for our comparative analysis. 
Our proposition is: Differences in mission will be a funda-
mental distinguishing feature between social and commercial 
entrepreneurship that will manifest itself in multiple areas 
of enterprise management and personnel motivation. Com-
mercial and social dimensions within the enterprise may be 
a source of tension. 
● Resource mobilization. The nondistributive restriction 
on surpluses generated by nonprofit organizations and the 
embedded social purpose of for-profit or hybrid forms of 
social enterprise limits social entrepreneurs from tapping into 
the same capital markets as commercial entrepreneurs. Ad-
ditionally, the economics of a social entrepreneurial venture 
often make it difficult to compensate staff as competitively 
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as in commercial markets. In fact, many employees in social 
entrepreneurial organizations place considerable value on 
nonpecuniary compensation from their work. Our proposi-
tion is: Human and financial resource mobilization will be a 
prevailing difference and will lead to fundamentally different 
approaches in managing financial and human resources. 
● Performance measurement. The social purpose of the 
social entrepreneur creates greater challenges for measur-
ing performance than the commercial entrepreneur who 
can rely on relatively tangible and quantifiable measures 
of performance such as financial indicators, market share, 
customer satisfaction, and quality. Additionally, the various 
financial and nonfinancial stakeholders to which a social 
entrepreneurial organization are readily accountable to are 
greater in number and more varied, resulting in greater com-
plexity in managing these relationships (Kanter & Summers, 
1987). The challenge of measuring social change is great due 
to nonquantifiability, multicausality, temporal dimensions, 
and perceptive differences of the social impact created. Our 
proposition is: Performance measurement of social impact 
will remain a fundamental differentiator, complicating ac-
countability and stakeholder relations. 
Note that the distinction between social and commercial 
entrepreneurship is not dichotomous, but rather more accurately 
conceptualized as a continuum ranging from purely social to 
purely economic. Even at the extremes, however, there are still 
elements of both. That is, charitable activity must still reflect 
economic realities, while economic activity must still generate 
social value. Although social entrepreneurship is distinguished 
primarily by its social purpose and occurs through multiple 
and varied organizational forms, there is still significant het-
erogeneity in the types of activity that can fall under the social 
entrepreneurship rubric. Thus, while these four propositions 
can be distinguishing factors between commercial and social 
entrepreneurship, the degree to which they delineate the dif-
ferences can vary. For example, a social-purpose commercial 
enterprise may differ less on these dimensions from its com-
mercial counterparts than a social enterprise that does not have 
any commercial aspect to its operations. The four propositions 
are not meant to be definitive, nor exhaustive, but rather pro-
vide us with a theoretical frame with which to engage in the 
subsequent comparative analysis. 
3. commErcIal EntrEprEnEurshIp modEl 
Although the concept of entrepreneurship was first defined 
more than 250 years ago, many have held it as one of the mys-
terious forces of human nature. The practice of entrepreneurship 
is, of course, as old as trading between tribes and villages. Many 
different and useful approaches have been used to describe and 
to analyze entrepreneurship. They have tended to fall within 
three main streams of research, which include a focus on the 
results of entrepreneurship, the causes of entrepreneurship, and 
entrepreneurial management (Stevenson & Jarillo, 1991). In the 
first stream of research, economists have explored the impacts 
and results of entrepreneurship. For example, Schumpeter 
(1934), in his seminal article, examined entrepreneurship as a 
key process through which the economy as a whole is advanced. 
The second stream of research has focused on the entrepreneurs 
themselves. Research in this stream examines entrepreneurship 
from a psychological and sociological perspective (e.g., Collins 
& Moore, 1964; McClelland, 1961). Finally, the third stream 
has focused on the entrepreneurial management process. This 
diverse literature includes research on how to foster innovation 
within established corporations (e.g., Burgelman, 1983, 1984), 
start-ups and venture capital (e.g., Timmons & Bygrave, 1986), 
organizational life cycles (e.g., Quinn & Cameron, 1983), and 
predictors of entrepreneurial success (e.g., Cooper & Bruno, 
1975; Dollinger, 1984). 
Clearly from these three streams of research, earlier con-
ceptualizations of entrepreneurship have often focused on 
either the economic function of entrepreneurship or on the 
nature of the individual who is “the entrepreneur,” whereas in 
recent years, significant research has focused on the search of 
the “how” of entrepreneurship. Among the many engaged in 
this area, Stevenson (1983) defined entrepreneurship as “The 
pursuit of opportunity beyond the tangible resources that you 
currently control.” With this definition, emphasis is placed 
upon how opportunity can be recognized, the process of com-
mitting to an opportunity, gaining control over the resources, 
managing the network of resources that may or may not be 
within a single hierarchy, and the way in which participants 
are rewarded (Stevenson, 1985; Stevenson & Jarillo, 1991). 
The entrepreneurial organization focuses on opportunity, not 
resources. Entrepreneurs must commit quickly, but tentatively, 
to be able to readjust as new information arises. The process of 
commitment becomes multistaged, limiting the commitment of 
resources at each stage to an amount sufficient to generate new 
information and success before more resources are sought. The 
entrepreneurial organization uses the resources that lie within 
the hierarchical control of others and, therefore, must manage 
the network as well as the hierarchy. 
Given our aim in this article of developing a framework 
on how to approach the social entrepreneurial process more 
systematically and effectively, we draw on the literature fo-
cusing on the “how” of entrepreneurship. We use Stevenson’s 
definition of entrepreneurship and build on Sahlman’s (1996) 
analytical framework from the entrepreneurial management lit-
erature. Sahlman’s model succinctly captures the key elements 
that are critical considerations for commercial entrepreneur-
ship, and therefore provides a strong basis for developing a 
framework for social entrepreneurship. This model stresses the 
creation of a dynamic fit among four interrelated components: 
the people, the context, the deal, and the opportunity (PCDO) 
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(Sahlman, 1996). Because these elements are interdependent 
and are situationally determined, the entrepreneur must manage 
the fit and must adapt continuously to new circumstances over 
time. People is defined as those who actively participate in the 
venture or who bring resources to the venture. They include 
both those within the organization and those outside who must 
be involved for the venture to succeed. People’s skills, attitudes, 
knowledge, contacts, goals, and values provide the resource 
mix that contributes centrally to success. The presumption 
that economic selfinterest drives most economic activity in 
organizations can lead to dangerous and expensive mistakes. 
Whether in nonprofit or in for-profit organizations, the whole 
person with multiple motivations and capacities creates the 
energy and determines the nature of the outcome. 
Context is defined as those elements outside the control of 
the entrepreneur that will influence success or failure. Con-
textual factors include the macroeconomy, tax and regulatory 
structure, and sociopolitical environment. Economic environ-
ment, tax policies, employment levels, technological advances, 
and social movements such as those involving labor, religion 
and politics are examples of specific contextual factors that can 
frame the opportunities and the risks that a new venture faces. 
With this definition, it is clear that one of the critical elements 
for success is defining those elements that must be consciously 
dealt with, and those that can simply play out as they will. 
Attention to everything can mean attention to nothing. On the 
other hand, leaving out a single critical element of context can 
be the precursor of failure. 
Deal is the substance of the bargain that defines who in a 
venture gives what, who gets what, and when those deliveries 
and receipts will take place. Each transaction delivers a bundle 
of values. They include economic benefits, social recognition, 
autonomy and decision rights, satisfaction of deep personal 
needs, social interactions, fulfillment of generative and legacy 
desires, and delivery on altruistic goals. 
Opportunity is defined as “any activity requiring the invest-
ment of scarce resources in hopes of a future return” (Sahlman, 
1996, p.140). Change is motivated by the vision of the future 
that is better for the decision maker, and by the credibility 
of the path presented to that desired future state. One of the 
historic difficulties in the study of entrepreneurship is that the 
definition of opportunity is not necessarily shared by the mul-
tiple constituencies who must work together to create change. 
Often change affects power relationships, economic interests, 
personal networks, and even self-image. A critical factor that 
creates motivation for joint action arises out of the ability to 
create a common definition of opportunity that can be shared. 
Even slight perturbation in one of these PCDO domains can 
have tremendous implications for the others. Changing people 
often requires a different deal. Changing context can render 
the skill set of one group obsolete and make another group’s 
skills more important. Different opportunities are perceived in 
differing contexts, and amending a deal may attract new play-
ers and drive away the old. Entrepreneurs must consciously 
manage the dynamic fit among these elements (see Figure 1 
[Sahlman, 1996]). 
Figure 1: PCDO Framework 
Source: Sahlman (1996).
Note: PCDO = people, context, deal, opportunity.
4.  applyIng pcdo to socIal  
 EntrEprEnEurshIp 
Now that we have developed a working definition of social 
entrepreneurship and have elaborated on the PCDO framework 
from commercial entrepreneurship, we can begin to explore 
how the PCDO model applies to social entrepreneurship. The 
comparative analysis of the two forms of entrepreneurship for 
each of the PCDO elements highlights key similarities first, and 
then identifies significant differences. Linkages to our initial 
theoretical propositions about differences are highlighted in 
boldface type. This analysis also provides the basis for draw-
ing out lessons that can be useful for social entrepreneurs and 
researchers. In the following analysis, we will first examine 
opportunity and context, which together determine the scope 
of the opportunity. Then, we will turn to a discussion of the 
people and deal dimensions of the venture. The key differences 
in these factors for social and commercial entrepreneurship 
will be illustrated by case examples. While such examples 
can only provide limited supporting empirical evidence for 
grounded theory building, they can be helpful in capturing 
illumination from practice that can signal promising paths for 
further investigation. 
4.1. Opportunity 
Opportunity is defined as the desired future state that is dif-
ferent from the present and the belief that the achievement of 
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that state is possible. Opportunities in the commercial and social 
sectors require the investment of scarce resources with the hope 
of future returns. In social and commercial entrepreneurship, 
entrepreneurs are concerned about customers, suppliers, entry 
barriers, substitutes, rivalry, and the economics of the venture, 
although perhaps to varying degrees due to differences in the 
market dynamics between the commercial and social sectors as 
discussed previously (Oster, 1994, 1995; Porter, 1980, 1985). 
The key difference is that in commercial entrepreneurship, the 
primary focus is on economic returns while in social entrepre-
neurship, the focus is on social returns. 
At a conceptual level, opportunities may seem similar across 
commercial and social entrepreneurship. However, in practice, 
the opportunity dimension of the framework is perhaps the 
most distinct owing to fundamental differences in missions 
and responses to market failure. Commercial entrepreneur-
ship tends to focus on breakthroughs and new needs, whereas 
social entrepreneurship often focuses on serving basic, long- 
-standing needs more effectively through innovative approach-
es. For a commercial entrepreneur, an opportunity must have 
a large, or growing total market size and the industry must be 
structurally attractive. For a social entrepreneur, a recognized 
social need, demand, or market failure usually guarantees a 
more than sufficient market size. Social entrepreneurs believe 
that their theory of change and accompanying organizational 
model is able to meet these needs in a superior way. The prob-
lem is not the existence of the need, but rather whether the ne-
cessary resources can be marshaled for the social entrepreneur’s 
innovation to serve that need. The scope of opportunities for 
social entrepreneurs is relatively wide because they are able to 
pursue ventures that are financially self-sustaining as well as 
those that require donor subsidies. Unlike in the commercial 
sector in which unexploited, profitable, high-growth oppor-
tunities are relatively hard to capture, in the social sector, social 
needs, and hence opportunities for social entrepreneurs, often 
far outstrip the resources available to address them, particularly 
because the ultimate consumers are often unable to pay enough 
to cover the costs of the goods or services. Consequently, even 
before growth has been considered, much less a strategy for 
growth laid out, social entrepreneurs and their organizations 
are often pulled into rapid growth by pressure from funders, 
demand for their products or services, and pushed by their social 
missions to meet those needs (Bradach, 2003; Dees, Anderson, 
& Wei-Skillern, 2004). Furthermore, social entrepreneurs’ 
belief that their theory of change and organizational approach 
is superior often drives the organization to pursue growth as 
a means for achieving greater social impact (Colby, Stone, & 
Carttar, 2004). Thus, a social enterprise may often launch into 
growth and expansion before sufficient thought or planning 
has been put into it. 
A case in point is KaBOOM!, a nonprofit organization that 
has raised more than $10 million for community playgrounds 
since 1995 (Austin & Porraz, 2002). During a period of par-
ticularly high growth in 1998, in which revenues doubled, 
the organization encountered some difficulties managing a 
multitude of partnerships. As one board member described, 
“KaBOOM! was building the plane while they were flying it, 
and they had to slow down to speed up again.” 
In comparing the nature of opportunities in the commercial 
and social sectors, clearly, there are abundant opportunities 
in the latter relative to the former. The demand for social 
entrepreneurial programs and services usually far exceed the 
capacity of the social enterprises to serve these needs. Initial 
successes often lead to increased demand for the social enter-
prise’s programs, products, or services, or even requests to scale 
or replicate the organization in some form. For many of the 
employees and for the outside funders, the growth imperative 
often becomes paramount. It fulfills their personal needs and 
builds upon their values. 
The growth may involve scaling the organization directly, 
working in partnership with other organizations to disseminate 
the social innovation, or some combination of approaches. A 
key challenge for social entrepreneurs is to resist the powerful 
demand–pull for growth, and to be more deliberate about plan-
ning a long-term impact strategy. Social entrepreneurs should 
realize that they have great latitude in the ways they can choose 
to pursue these opportunities. In some cases, growth may not 
be the best approach to achieve the organization’s goals or to 
have the greatest social impact. Growth for the sake of growth 
has the potential to squander organizational resources and can 
actually detract from the organization’s overall impact. In other 
cases, organizational growth may, in fact, be the best path to 
optimizing social impact, but the organization may need to plan 
for a long-term growth strategy as it may not have the resources 
or the capacity to grow immediately. 
Guide Dogs for the Blind Association (GDBA), a U.K.-
-based social enterprise and the world’s leading breeder and 
trainer of seeing-eye dogs, illustrates the need for deliberate 
strategic planning for growth (Grossman, Wei-Skillern, & Lieb, 
2003). The organization responded to the demand for expanded 
services in the early 1990s, adding hotel and holiday programs 
for the visually impaired to its traditional guide-dog services. 
While these new services were well received by some clients, 
they resulted in significant financial losses to the organization 
to the point in which the long-term sustainability of the entire 
organization was threatened. In 1997, the financial state of the 
organization was so severe that the trustees hired a new chief 
executive officer with a mandate to stem the losses, while 
continuing to maintain the high-quality of its mobility service 
programs. For several years, GDBA engaged in organizational 
innovation by establishing and investing heavily in partnerships 
to transfer operations of the hotel and holiday programs to other 
charities serving the visually impaired sector in these areas. At 
the same time, consistent with the organization’s mission to 
provide guide dogs, mobility, and other rehabilitation services 
that meet the needs of blind and partially sighted people, the 
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organization focused on enhancing the range of mobility ser-
vices provided to clients, such as long-cane training. Ultimately, 
the organization pared down its services portfolio to include 
only those activities directly in line with its mission and for 
which it had the resources and capacity to serve most effec-
tively. Although this involved scaling back certain activities, 
despite demand for such services, it enabled the organization 
to continue to excel at delivering the core activity of providing 
guide dog and mobility services to its clients, ultimately keeping 
the organization focused on activities in which it could have 
superior social impact. 
As in the GDBA case, unbridled growth can be a drain on 
the organization’s talent and resources, and can even under-
mine existing successes. In approaching any type of growth, 
whether expanding the range of services to geographic expan-
sion through replication, a social entrepreneur must identify 
the relevant risks and must approach all growth opportunities 
with disciplined, strategic thinking. Among the issues a social 
entrepreneur should keep in mind are the organization’s mis-
sion and goals, how growth fits with those goals, the range of 
strategies that the organization can pursue to achieve these 
goals, and whether the human and financial resources available 
to the organization are consistent with these goals. In contrast 
to commercial entrepreneurship, the public-betterment mission 
may lead a social entrepreneur to invest in sector-level capacity 
and may actually encourage or enable complementary or even 
competitor organizations to grow to further the shared social 
mission, rather than to be primarily concerned about capturing 
greater market share for one’s own organization. 
4.2. Context 
The external context, defined as factors affecting the nature 
and outcome of the opportunity, but are outside the control of 
management, has considerable overlap for commercial and 
social entrepreneurship. They include the macroeconomy, the 
tax and regulatory, and the sociopolitical environment. In the 
social sector, these contextual factors can be equally as impor-
tant as in the commercial sector. 
The philanthropic market is highly affected by economic 
activity, as much philanthropic capital originates from com-
mercial enterprise. Additionally, many nonprofit endowment 
funds are invested directly in the stock market, and individual 
contributions are tied directly to people’s levels of discretion-
ary income. In general, government regulations are relevant 
to both. Leaders must know the specific types of laws and 
regulations affecting their ability to function. Laws regulating 
the tax-exempt status or operations of nonprofits, tax policies 
that influence the amount of giving to the sector, and specific 
social policies affect the needs or resources for certain types 
of social issues such as education, environment, health, and 
housing. Finally, just as commercial enterprises compete with 
each other for such resources as funding from investors, market 
share for customers, and the most talented employees, social 
enterprises compete with each other for philanthropic dollars, 
government grants and contracts, volunteers, community mind-
share, political attention and clients or customers, and talent 
within their “industry” contexts. 
Although the critical contextual factors are analogous 
in many ways, the impact of the context on a social entre-
preneur differs from that of a commercial entrepreneur 
because of the way the interaction of a social venture’s 
mission and performance measurement systems influences 
entrepreneurial behavior. The market-selection mechanisms 
in the social sector are relatively less intense because they tend 
to be less powerful and act over longer periods of time. For 
example, in many cases, a social entrepreneur can still meet 
with some degree of success, while pursuing an opportunity, 
despite an inhospitable context. In fact, social entrepreneurs 
may choose to pursue opportunities to address social change 
not despite of, but because of, an inhospitable context. Thus, 
social entrepreneurs may respond in fundamentally different 
ways to adverse contextual conditions than their commercial 
counterparts. To illustrate, during harsh economic times, social 
needs tend to intensify, and many new social enterprises may 
be established to serve these needs, despite an adverse funding 
environment. In other cases, a social issue may be compelling 
only to a relatively small number of constituencies and may 
have very low visibility, yet a social entrepreneur may seek 
to make an impact by raising awareness and attention to the 
issue. Indeed, an adverse context may often lead the social 
entrepreneur to seek to change the context itself, as often the 
social problem is deeply embedded in contextual factors 
A case in point is the National Organization for Rare Dis-
orders (NORD), a unique federation of independent voluntary 
health organizations dedicated to helping people with rare 
diseases and assisting the organizations that serve them (NORD 
website, http://www.rarediseases.org). The organization was 
founded in 1983 by patients and families, who worked together 
to get the Orphan Drug Act, which would provide incentives 
for the development of treatments of rare disorders, passed by 
the U.S. Congress and signed by President Reagan in 1983. 
In the 20 years since the legislation, the number of treatments 
developed for orphan diseases has increased by more than 20 
times compared with the previous decade. In this case, the 
context was highly unfavorable; the issue had received rela-
tively little attention and had a small number of supporters. Yet, 
despite inhospitable factors in the context, the entrepreneurial 
efforts and innovative approach of the organization gener-
ated considerable social impact. In other cases, signals from 
the market context are often difficult to decipher, and social 
entrepreneurs, driven by their social mission, may pay less at-
tention to the contextual factors and may forge ahead without 
a clear understanding of their impact. Although competition 
certainly exists among social-sector organizations, organiza-
tions are not often rewarded for good performance in the form 
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of increased funding. Many have attributed this to the fact that 
impact and performance are notoriously difficult to measure in 
the social sector, and even if methods are devised to measure 
performance, the true organizational impacts take a long time 
to manifest themselves. 
While the social marketplace may not reward entrepreneurs 
for superior performance as readily as the commercial market-
place does for commercial entrepreneurs, neither does inferior 
performance get punished as readily. Some would argue that 
the discipline of the market applies less to social entrepreneurs. 
The for-profit entrepreneur often exits or is replaced if the 
measures of progress are not met. Apparently, many social 
enterprises that are inefficient or ineffective at delivering their 
services often can continue for some time. Many constituents, 
such as funders and board members, focus on the organiza-
tion’s social mission and fail to emphasize accountability and 
high performance for the organization (e.g., Letts, Grossman, 
& Ryan, 1999). The fact that their missions involve the cre-
ation of social value may insulate social enterprises from the 
same type of punitive discipline that occurs in the commercial 
marketplace. There tends to be a greater forgiveness factor or 
margin for error among capital providers, particularly because 
social-enterprise performance is so difficult to measure. In 
short, market forces neither reward high performance nor 
punish poor performance as much, or as readily as for purely 
commercial organizations. 
While the macroeconomic and social-sector contexts un-
doubtedly have an impact on the outcomes of opportunities 
that social entrepreneurs pursue, as discussed previously, the 
impacts of these contextual factors are often rather ambiguous. 
Social entrepreneurs may therefore have a tendency to pay 
less attention to the operating context, since the consequences 
for doing so may manifest themselves rather slowly, if at all. 
Nonetheless, paying greater attention to the context and actively 
monitoring it for potential threats and opportunities can enable 
a social entrepreneur to develop an adaptive strategy that takes 
into account various contingencies. This proactive approach can 
ensure that the venture is better prepared to deal with sudden 
environmental shifts or changes, which can present threats and 
opportunities. 
The dramatic changes in the health care industry exemplify 
such contextual shifts. For example, the board of trustees of the 
Mt. Auburn Hospital, a nonprofit community hospital in Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, recognized that the economic realities of 
their industry were leading to a major consolidation (McFarlan 
& Elias, 1996). Although they were in a solid financial posi-
tion, their scanning of the environment led them to conclude 
that smaller facilities, like theirs, were an endangered species. 
Consequently, they took a very proactive approach to locating 
another larger hospital with whom they could merge. This ex-
emplified the entrepreneurial process of creative destruction, 
reinventing the organizational configuration to survive in the 
face of tectonic shifts in the contextual plates. 
Perhaps more important than fending off threats, monitoring 
the context can enable a social entrepreneur to identify oppor-
tunities for the enterprise that might otherwise be overlooked. 
For example, emerging trends in the philanthropic capital 
markets may provide social entrepreneurs astute enough to 
identify these shifts with valuable opportunities for new pro-
grams, fundraising, and potential partnerships, among others. 
To illustrate, the Sesame Workshop, a nonprofit educational 
organization best known for its flagship series “Sesame Street,” 
has the mission to make a meaningful difference in the lives of 
children worldwide by addressing their critical developmental 
needs (Sesame Workshop, 2002). The organization, founded in 
1968 with the aim of using television as a tool to help children 
learn, pioneered the concept of creating entertaining and enrich-
ing television for children. Today, the organization operates in 
a highly competitive context increasingly dominated by large, 
for-profit children’s media companies. To continue to deliver 
on its mission in this context, it has sought to engage in social 
entrepreneurship by supporting its educational programs with 
revenue-generating activities, which include global product 
licensing, book publishing, domestic and foreign distribution of 
local-language television programs, coproductions, and overseas 
syndication of its portfolio of educational programs. In recent 
years, these self-generated revenues have become the largest 
contributor to the organization’s resources and are central to 
furthering the organization’s educational initiatives worldwide. 
While organizational survival in the social sector may not 
always seem to depend upon responsiveness to the context, a 
social enterprise that monitors the context closely on an ongo-
ing basis can develop strategies to minimize the impacts of 
adverse environmental changes, capitalizing on opportunities 
that might arise from favorable trends. The context shapes the 
opportunities available to the social entrepreneur. Ultimately, 
this proactive management approach will best enable the organ-
ization to target the best opportunities and mobilize resources 
to achieve the greatest social impact. 
4.3. People and resources 
In many ways, the human and financial capital inputs es-
sential to the entrepreneurial venture are quite comparable 
between social and commercial entrepreneurship. Both com-
mercial and social entrepreneurs must consider the managers, 
employees, funders, and other organizations critical to their 
success, and how to capture this human talent for their ventures. 
As noted by Sahlman (1996) and Hart, Stevenson, and Dial 
(1996), two key determinants of whether or not a commercial 
entrepreneur will succeed in this effort are that entrepreneurs 
(1) know the industry in which they are seeking to garner 
resources and launch a new enterprise, and (2) are known by 
others for their abilities. Specifically, they must know the key 
suppliers, customers, competitors, and the talent that they need 
to bring into their organization. They must also be recognized 
R.Adm., São Paulo, v.47, n.3, p.370-384, jul./ago/set. 2012 377
SociAl And commerciAl entrepreneurSHip: SAme, different, or BotH?
by others for their reputations and capabilities to gain the trust 
of others who will be willing to work with and invest in them. 
While social entrepreneurs are seeking to attract resources for 
the social good, rather than for financial returns, they rely just 
as much, if not more so, on a robust network of contacts that 
will provide them with access to funding, board members, 
and management and staff, among other resources. To attract 
these resources, social entrepreneurs, like their commercial 
counterparts, must have a strong reputation that engenders trust 
among its contributors, and a willingness to invest in the social 
enterprise and its mission. Reputation for fairness and skill in 
dealing with the individual needs of the key players is often 
the difference between attracting great resources and being an 
interesting, but unfunded idea. 
Despite many similarities, the nature of the human and 
financial resources for social entrepreneurship differs in 
some key respects, primarily because of difficulties in re-
source mobilization. Unlike a commercial entrepreneur who 
often has the financial resources or incentives to recruit and 
retain talent, social entrepreneurs are rarely able to pay market 
rates for key hires (Oster, 1995) nor are they able offer other 
equity incentives such as stock options, except when the social 
entrepreneur has opted for a for-profit organizational form. As 
noted by Oster (1995), evidence for this pattern of lower com-
pensation has been found in many nonprofit subsectors, such as 
health care (e.g., Cole, 1982), education (e.g., Freeman, 1979), 
as well as among various professionals in the sector, from 
lawyers to managers (e.g., Preston, 1989; Weisbrod, 1983). 
Furthermore, social enterprises often rely upon volunteers 
to serve key functions, such as board members, to help with 
fundraising or to provide professional services, or as staff to 
deliver their services on the ground. 
An example of this reliance on volunteer staff is Ducks 
Unlimited, the world’s largest private waterfowl and wetlands 
conservation organization that has a membership of over 
700,000 persons and over 50,000 volunteers. In fiscal year 
2002, volunteers held over 6,000 fundraising events, which 
generated 32% of a total of $185.7 million in revenues and 
67% of the organization’s membership (Ducks Unlimited 
website, http:// www.ducks.org). Clearly, this innovative use 
of and heavy reliance on volunteers at the grassroots level for 
such core organizational functions present a very different set 
of management challenges for the organization’s leadership. 
Both the start-up and the philanthropic capital markets 
are fragmented. Traditionally, start-ups rely on the three “F”s 
(friends, family, and fools) for most of their funding, with the 
exception of the very small percentage of start-ups receiving 
formal venture capital. Social entrepreneurs often rely heav-
ily upon a range of funding sources, including individual 
contributions, foundation grants, member dues, user fees, and 
government payments. Furthermore, these funders have a 
wide range of motivations and expectations. In the commercial 
capital markets, the key motivation for all players involved is 
most often to build a profitable company and to earn an at-
tractive return on investment. Thus, investors often provide 
a significant portion of relatively long-term funding, while at 
the same time, help raise additional funds for the venture. A 
multitude of competing financial institutions offer a wide range 
of financial instruments to meet the different needs of com-
mercial entrepreneurs at distinct stages in their organizational 
evolution, once viability is demonstrated. The for-profit world 
experiences many degrees of freedom to change entrepreneurs, 
business plans, products, and markets served. Few for-profit 
businesses actually wind up executing their initial business 
plan. They may have to change many factors, but can seek spe-
cialized distribution partners, financial partners, and employees 
who buy into and implement the new plan. This institutional 
breadth, flexibility, and specialization do not exist to the same 
extent in the philanthropic markets. Social entrepreneurs have 
far fewer channels for accessing unrestricted sources of capital. 
Furthermore, the social entrepreneur must rely perpetually on 
these sources since the operations rarely, if ever, will attain 
breakeven without some donor support, even those which have 
launched entrepreneurial earned-income operations (Foster 
& Bradach, 2005). Additionally, social entrepreneurs cannot 
readily switch products or markets because the capacity to 
motivate and attract people and funding is tied to the specific 
social problem or need being addressed. The emotional and 
psychological dimensions create strategic stickiness. 
In short, while the human and financial resources required 
for success have similarities across commercial and social 
entrepreneurship, social entrepreneurs are often faced with 
more constraints: limited access to the best talent; fewer 
financial institutions, instruments, and resources; and scarce 
unrestricted funding and inherent strategic rigidities, which 
hinder their ability to mobilize and deploy resources to achieve 
the organization’s ambitious goals. To overcome some of these 
barriers, social entrepreneurs sometimes opt for a for-profit or-
ganizational form to increase their ability to access commercial 
capital markets and to pay more competitive wages to attract 
talent. However, even the corporate form does not remove all 
the constraints, as social entrepreneurs are then faced with the 
challenge of maintaining a focus on the social mission, while 
generating a competitive return for investors. 
Given these constraints, it is critical for the social entre-
preneur to develop a large network of strong supporters, and 
an ability to communicate the impact of the venture’s work 
to leverage resources outside organizational boundaries that 
can enable them to achieve their goals. The work of Steve 
Mariotti, founder of the National Foundation for Teaching 
Entrepreneurship (NFTE), the world’s largest organization 
promoting entrepreneurial leadership among youth, illustrates 
the resourcefulness required of a social entrepreneur (Dees & 
Oberfield, 1991). NFTE was initially founded by Mariotti, as 
a small operation run out of his apartment, with a small board 
composed of family and friends. Through building a powerful 
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network of key staff and supporters convinced of the value of the 
mission and the organization’s capacity to deliver on it, NFTE 
has since grown to become a $6 million organization, with 
prominent board members and supporters from leading busi-
nesses, such as Microsoft, and Goldman Sachs and Company. 
Additionally, a social entrepreneur must be skilled at man-
aging a wider diversity of relationships with funders, manag-
ers, and staff from a range of backgrounds, volunteers, board 
members, and other partners, with fewer management levers, 
as financial incentives are less readily available, and manage-
ment authority over supporters, volunteer staff, and trustees is 
rather limited. The diversity of relationships also extends to the 
types of relationships, as social entrepreneurs may often need 
to work collaboratively with other nonprofit organizations, 
business, and government to attain the resources critical for the 
organization. Examples might include partnerships that enable 
nonprofit organizations to pool resources to develop capabilities 
they could not afford to develop on their own. Such capabilities 
include investing in systems, such as information technology 
for managing members, volunteers, and funders, or collaborat-
ing with other nonprofits to deliver programs or services, or 
cross-sector partnerships that bring valuable resources to the 
social enterprise, while creating mutual benefit for the govern-
ment or the corporate partner (Austin, 2000). 
The September 11th Fund, one of the largest foundations 
established in the wake of the September 11th tragedies, pro-
vides an example of this resourcefulness (Wei-Skillern, 2002). 
The foundation leveraged both intrasector and cross-sector 
collaboration to procure the resources necessary for its success. 
The fundraising and grant-making expertise of the founding 
partners, the New York Community Trust and the United Way of 
New York City, provided complementary skills, while support 
from businesses such as McKinsey Consulting and International 
Business Machines provided additional managerial and techni-
cal expertise for managing the influx of donations. 
Another example might be contributing to and participating 
in sector-wide knowledge sharing or professional networks 
that broaden the knowledge base and talent pool available to 
the organization, and the sector as a whole. Often social-sector 
entrepreneurs see others serving the same needs as competi-
tors for funding, but these competitors can also be allies in 
the service of their objectives. For example, in the case of 
Women’s World Banking, the organization invested heavily 
in building sector-wide networks among leading microfinance 
organizations to build joint knowledge and to strengthen the 
sector’s ability to affect banking regulations that influenced 
microfinance (Austin & Harmeling, 1999). While the network 
members might have viewed each other as competitors, the 
participants have found participation in the networks to further 
not only their own organization’s objectives, but also those of 
the microfinance sector as a whole. 
To expand organizational capacity with limited resources, 
the social entrepreneur must focus on building a rich network 
of contacts and resources, developing the skills to manage the 
various relationships in this network effectively, and seeking 
out creative arrangements. NewSchools’ venture fund, a leading 
venture-philanthropy fund in the education sector, established 
the NewSchools Network, which exemplifies this approach 
(Bradach & Tempest, 2000). The network consists of a bipar-
tisan community of education, nonprofit policy, and business 
leaders who work in collaboration toward the goal of education 
reform. In addition to NewSchools’ direct work of funding and 
providing support to promising education ventures, its network 
leverages resources outside the organization’s boundaries to 
effect change in the public education system (NewSchools 
website, http://www.newschools.org). 
While networks are important in commercial entrepreneur-
ship, political and relationship management skills are of utmost 
importance to social entrepreneurs because such a large portion 
of the resources they rely upon for success are outside their 
direct control, from board members to donors, partners, and 
volunteers. For example, research suggests that grantor–grantee 
relationships are often a more powerful determinant of the grant 
decision than the particulars of the proposal (Grønbjerg, Martell, 
& Paarlberg, 2000). Aaron Lieberman, founder of Jumpstart, a 
fast-growing, early childhood education program, reflected on 
his experience noting that “the connection between Jumpstart’s 
success at demonstrating impact and its ability to fund raise is, 
at best, tenuous. Fund raising success comes primarily from 
building relationships based on trust and reputation—which can 
be completely disconnected from the actual performance of the 
organization” (Grossman & McCaffrey, 2001). Although non-
profit organizations often generate a significant amount of their 
revenues through various earned-income strategies, because the 
social-sector organization relies so heavily on resources outside 
organizational boundaries, the social entrepreneur must not only 
continuously manage and cultivate the organization’s network, 
but should also ensure that key staff also have and develop the 
skills to contribute to this critical task. 
4.4. Deals 
Deals are mutually beneficial contractual relationships be-
tween the entrepreneurial venture and all resource providers. 
Social and commercial entrepreneurs are all seeking investors 
to provide financial resources, as well as skills and talent to help 
them generate a return on their investments, whether financial 
or social. The sources of talent, contacts, capital, and amounts 
raised are of primary concern for both types of entrepreneurs. 
However, because of the way in which resources must 
be mobilized and because of the ambiguities associated with 
performance measurement, the terms of the deals are funda-
mentally different for commercial and social entrepreneurs. 
Deals involve the exchange of value. The value transactions in 
social entrepreneurship differ from commercial entrepreneurship 
in kind, consumers, timing, flexibility, and measurability. 
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In the kind of value involved in the exchanges, social en-
trepreneurs must rely much more upon creative strategies to 
offset limited financial rewards and incentives with nonfinancial 
incentives to recruit, retain, and motivate staff, volunteers, 
members, and funders. Nonpecuniary motivation of staff rep-
resents one of the areas that commercial enterprises can learn 
from practice in social enterprises (e.g., Drucker, 1989). Social 
entrepreneurs often have to provide value more explicitly with a 
much more heterogeneous set of stakeholders than companies, 
and each group is seeking or giving a distinct form of value 
from the relationship. 
The social entrepreneur’s transactional relationship with 
the consumer of its goods or services is quite distinct from the 
commercial entrepreneur’s. The former often has little or no 
economic capability and has few consumption alternatives. 
Consequently, the social consumers have little economic or 
market power to exercise in the transactional relationship with 
the social enterprise. Thus, the market mechanism through 
which consumers vote with their dollars is virtually absent for 
social entrepreneurs. Third-party payers or sources of subsidy 
fill this economic vacuum. Consequently, many social entre-
preneurs consider their funders as their primary clients. 
In timing and flexibility, the financial deals made between 
commercial entrepreneurs and their funders differ markedly 
from social entrepreneurs and their funders. Commercial en-
trepreneurs are generally given discretion to use the capital 
toward those activities that they decide will add the most value 
to the venture. Social-enterprise investors generally provide a 
relatively small portion of the enterprise’s capital needs for a 
relatively short period of time (Letts, Grossman, & Ryan, 1999). 
Social entrepreneurs are thus required to spend a significant 
portion of their time, on an ongoing basis, cobbling together 
numerous grants, many of which come with spending restric-
tions and varied expectations of accountability, just to meet 
day-to-day operating costs. The duration of funding tends to 
be considerably shorter in term for social enterprises, with 
grants often being made on an annual basis, thereby creating 
an ongoing pressure for social entrepreneurs to give fundraising 
activities priority ahead of most other management demands. 
The ongoing evaluation and return that investors receive 
from a social entrepreneurial investment pose a major challenge 
because of the relatively greater complexity of measurability. 
Commercial entrepreneurs and their funders, appropriately, 
have a central concern about the financial return that they will 
gain from the venture, and thus focus on the valuation of the 
company and on the equity distribution of the deal. For inves-
tors in social entrepreneurship, considerably more uncertainty 
is in the deal due to the fact that there is no single factor, such 
as profit or investment returns, that aligns the interests and 
actions of the various parties involved. The quantification or 
precise measurement of social impact is complicated due to the 
nature of social phenomenon, multicausality of underlying fac-
tors, and lengthy temporal manifestation, among other factors. 
Although there is no single measure such as rate of return to 
align the interests of all parties involved, the social enterprise’s 
mission often provides a common anchor for diverse stakehold-
ers. It is critical for social entrepreneurs to have a clear under-
standing of their enterprise’s theory of change, or the process by 
which the social innovation is going to have a social impact, and 
moreover, to be able to make a compelling case to participants 
and contributors so that the enterprise’s social-value produc-
tion chain can generate superior social returns. Because of the 
aforementioned need to rely continually on external resources, 
the social entrepreneurs’ deals must be robust to change and 
contemplate the need to expand the base and to provide new 
opportunities. In forging the many deals necessary to launch and 
sustain the venture, social entrepreneurs must therefore balance 
the costs to attain various resources with the potential benefits that 
accrue to the organization and its clients on a case-by-case basis. 
For example, City Year, a nonprofit organization that en-
gages youth in national service, depends upon a wide range 
of funding sources, from government AmeriCorp grants to 
a number of prominent corporate sponsors, such as Cisco, 
Comcast, and Timberland, each of which entails grants of 
various magnitudes and reporting requirements, among other 
expectations (City Year website, http://www.cityyear.org). The 
challenge facing the social entrepreneurs leading the organiza-
tion is to develop a strategy, weighing the various benefits and 
concerns with each deal, and to create a portfolio that sustains 
the organization and enables it to expand nationally to serve its 
clients and to carry out its mission most effectively. The nature 
of the social investments is very different from a provider’s 
perspective. Philanthropic funders and volunteers are moti-
vated to donate their money or time for a range of reasons as 
mentioned previously. Consequently, philanthropic donors also 
tend to put more varied demands on their grantees in an effort 
to meet their own objectives. Examples of such demands might 
include a board position, grant restrictions, or certain reporting 
requirements. Each of these demands can impose significant 
limitations on a social entrepreneurs’ ability to determine how 
resources can best be deployed to reach organizational goals. 
The goals and objectives of the multitude of constituencies 
of a social enterprise, from the social entrepreneur to board 
members and other volunteers, funders, and clients may vary 
widely, and even if there is some consensus, the best means for 
achieving the goals and objectives may diverge. Thus, negotiat-
ing deals between the social entrepreneur and various resource 
providers that create alignment between goals and incentives 
is considerably more complex and challenging in social than 
in commercial entrepreneurship. 
5. a FramEwork For socIal  
 EntrEprEnEurshIp 
Our analysis reveals that while many commonalities ex-
ist between social and commercial entrepreneurship, some 
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important differences related to our original propositions 
regarding market failure, mission, resource mobilization, and 
performance measurement also exist. The previous section 
identified specific managerial considerations for negotiating the 
unique challenges of applying the PCDO framework to social 
entrepreneurship. While the PCDO framework is in many ways 
applicable to the analysis of social entrepreneurship, we suggest 
that some adaptations might make it even more useful to both 
practitioners and researchers. To highlight the centrality of the 
social purpose in social entrepreneurship, we propose that this 
factor be the integrating driver of the framework. It is analogous 
to the “deal” variable in the PCDO in that it encompasses the 
terms of the undertaking, but those terms need to be related 
to and integrated by the core socialvalue proposition (SVP). 
The distinctive nature and central role of mission in social 
enterprises and the multifaceted nature of the social value 
generated give the SVP a logical centrality in the framework. 
We also believe that it would be analytically helpful to prac-
titioners and researchers to separate out the economic and the 
human resources as distinct variables. Our analysis revealed 
that the mobilization of financial and of human resources for 
social entrepreneurship are each quite distinct from commercial 
entrepreneurship and from each other, and so merit focused 
attention.(2) The opportunity variable remains, although the na-
ture of what is an opportunity is fundamentally different given 
the underlying generative effect of market failure. Contextual 
forces impinge on all the other variables and remain relevant 
to both forms of entrepreneurship, albeit with often fundamen-
tally differing effects. What might be deemed an unfavorable 
contextual factor for market-based commercial entrepreneur-
ship could be seen as an opportunity for a social entrepreneur 
aiming to address social needs arising from market failure. 
To enable a more disaggregated analysis of contextual forces 
that seem particularly relevant to social entrepreneurship, we 
added demographics, political, and sociocultural factors to the 
contextual factors presented in the original PCDO framework. 
Figure 2 presents this revised social entrepreneurship 
framework as a Venn diagram with the opportunity circle at 
the top, because this is the initiating point for entrepreneurship. 
The two enabling variables – people and capital resources – are 
the bottom circles. The three circles intersect, reflecting the 
overlapping and interdependent nature of the variables. At the 
center is the SVP as the integrating variable. Surrounding all 
three circles are the contextual forces shaping the other vari-
ables and requiring scrutiny by the entrepreneur. 
6. ImplIcatIons For practIcE 
6.1. Centrality of the SVP 
The foregoing analysis and framework underscore for 
practitioners the importance of a focus first and foremost on 
the SVP. This fact may seem patently obvious, as it is what 
drives most social entrepreneurs to pursue social entrepreneur- 
ship in the first place. However, in practice, it is often the case 
that the social entrepreneur becomes increasingly focused on 
organizational interests as a means to achieve social impact 
rather than on social impact itself. This phenomenon is not 
surprising given that the rationale is often that a larger, better- 
-resourced organization will be better able to deliver on its so-
cial mission. However, a number of factors limit the practicality 
of this approach. While people and resources supporting the 
venture’s growth are important and necessary, as our analysis 
has highlighted, mobilizing human and financial resources 
for social entrepreneurship is an extremely onerous task. The 
challenge of procuring resources for the organization can be-
come so all-consuming for the social entrepreneur that it can 
become a primary focus of the organization’s activities. The 
goal of furthering the organization may inadvertently become 
an end itself, sometimes at the cost of social-value creation. 
That is, social entrepreneurs may become so internally focused 
on procuring resources to support their organization’s growth 
that the paths to creating social value may become blurred. 
The resources are often a means of delivering on the SVP, but 
a broader perspective is needed. 
6.2. Organizational alignment 
To deliver effectively on the SVP, the social entrepreneur 
must achieve a state of alignment both externally and internally 
Figure 2: Social Entrepreneurship Framework
Note: SVP = social-value proposition.
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among the key components of the framework, the opportunity, 
people, capital, and context. For external alignment, the dynam-
ic nature of the context is a complicating fact. Thus, the SVP 
that made sense at the time of the venture’s founding may in fact 
evolve dramatically as perturbations in the operating context 
are continuously occurring. Remaining attuned to how con-
textual changes can affect the opportunity and the human- and 
financial-resource environment causing the need for realign-
ment is a critical skill for the social entrepreneur. Furthermore, 
practitioners should remain cognizant of a unique characteristic 
of the operating context, namely, that the societal demand for 
social-value creation is enormous. This creates a plethora of 
opportunities for social entrepreneurs and a concomitant ever- 
-present temptation to address more and more of them. A social 
entrepreneur’s task is then to determine at any given moment 
how to define the appropriate scope of the opportunity that can 
be pursued effectively. This will be dependent on ensuring that 
the scope is aligned internally with the available people and 
resources. Overextending the scope can cause a misalignment 
that could erode the core SVP. Seeking to address a very broad 
set of issues with very limited human and financial resources, 
may actually result in low social impact because the organiza-
tions resources are spread too thin. While a social entrepreneur 
may devote considerable attention to achieving both external 
and internal organizational alignment, it is also important to 
keep in mind that social impact can often be more effectively 
generated from beyond organizational boundaries. 
6.3. Organizational boundaries 
Although social value is very often created by bringing 
resources into the organization’s boundaries and by creat-
ing outputs directly, in other cases, the organization may 
actually have greater social impact by working in collabora-
tion with complementary organizations, or even former or 
potential competitors. Indeed greater social value can often 
be created by working collaboratively with other entities. 
The framework in Figure 2 helps conceptualize this latter 
approach. By being closely attuned to the context in which 
the venture operates, a social entrepreneur can identify how 
best to mobilize resources both internally and externally. A 
social enterprise exists to create social value, regardless of 
whether that value is generated from within or outside the 
organization’s boundaries. There may be opportunities to 
leverage resources outside the organization’s boundaries to 
create greater social value than could be generated by the 
organization alone. Although there are many obstacles to col-
laboration across organizational boundaries, such as concerns 
about organizational self-interest or sharing proprietary know - 
ledge, virtually all social issues require far more resources than 
any single organization is capable of mobilizing independently 
to solve. Networking across organizational boundaries to cre-
ate social value is a powerful strategy for social entrepreneurs 
because the objectives of creating social value do not require 
that value be captured within organizational boundaries. The 
social entrepreneurial venture can thus be conceptualized as 
a vehicle for creating social value, either directly or through 
facilitating the creation of social value with and by others. 
6.4. Research implications 
For researchers, a multitude of rich avenues merit further 
exploration. Building on the theoretical propositions we pos-
tulated at the beginning of the article and on our foregoing 
modified analytical framework, we offer the following sample 
of areas for investigation: 
1. Markets 
 • What are the effects of market forces on the formation and 
behavior of social enterprises? 
 • In mixed markets where nonprofit and for-profit organiza-
tions are both operating, what are the relative competitive 
advantages, disadvantages, and interactive dynamics? 
 • To what extent do social enterprises correct market failure? 
 • Do social enterprises perform the function of early-stage 
risk assumption and market development? 
 • What is the entrepreneurial process of identifying oppor-
tunities for social entrepreneurship? 
 • What affects the extent and form of competition and col-
laboration among social enterprises? 
2. Mission 
 • How does the mission affect strategy? 
 • How does the mission affect resource mobilization? 
 • How can powerful mission statements be created? 
 • What gives the mission statement force? 
3. Capital 
 • What are the key drivers of the philanthropic capital mar-
kets?
 • How efficient are these markets? 
 • What determines their structure? 
 • How does a social entrepreneur determine the optimum 
mix of financing sources for the social enterprise? 
 • To what extent are earned-income strategies successful? 
 • To what extent do these activities create tension with mis-
sion or organizational values? 
 • What have been the effects and effectiveness of applying 
the venture-capital approach to social entrepreneurship? 
 • What new financial instruments could be designed to over-
come some of the current deficiencies in the philanthropic 
capital markets? 
4. People 
 • What are the motivational constructs of social entrepreneurs 
and how do they compare with commercial entrepreneurs? 
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(1) The existence of externalities is another cause of 
social or public intervention.
(2) The separation of economic resources might even 
be helpful for the PCDO framework’s use for com-
mercial entrepreneurship.
 • What role do nonpecuniary incentives play in the mobiliza-
tion of people into social enterprises? 
 • To what extent can pecuniary incentive systems of busi-
nesses be effectively utilized in social enterprises and, 
vice versa, to what extent can nonpecuniary incen- 
tive systems in social enterprises be deployed in busi- 
nesses? 
 • What are the most effective ways for a social entrepreneur 
to mobilize and manage volunteers? 
5. Performance 
 • How can one measure social-value creation? 
 • How can entrepreneurs best communicate the SVP to dif-
ferent stakeholders? 
  • How can performance measures be most effectively inte-
grated into management systems? 
6. Context 
 • How do contextual forces shape opportunity creation for 
social entrepreneurship? 
 • How do country or community contextual differences 
change these forces? 
 • Which contextual forces foster social innovation and en-
trepreneurship? 
It is our hope that this article will stimulate and enable 
further scholarly exploration of the exceptionally complex and 
important issues surrounding social entrepreneurship. There is 
much intellectual and social value to be created.
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social and commercial entrepreneurship: same, different, or both? 
Entrepreneurship has been the engine propelling much of the growth of the business sector as well as a driving force 
behind the rapid expansion of the social sector. This article offers a comparative analysis of commercial and social 
entrepreneurship using a prevailing analytical model from commercial entrepreneurship. The analysis highlights 
key similarities and differences between these two forms of entrepreneurship and presents a framework on how to 
approach the social entrepreneurial process more systematically and effectively. We explore the implications of this 
analysis of social entrepreneurship for both practitioners and researchers. 
Keywords: commercial entrepreneurship, social entrepreneurship, similarities, differences.
Emprendedurismo social y comercial: ¿iguales, diferentes o ambos?
O emprendedurismo ha sido el motor que viene impeliendo una buena cuota del crecimiento del sector de negocios, 
además de ser la fuerza motriz responsable por la rápida expansión de este sector. Este artículo ofrece un análisis 
comparativo del emprendedurismo comercial y del social, valiéndose de un modelo analítico prevaleciente, prove-
niente del área del emprendedurismo comercial. El análisis destaca las principales semajanzas y diferencias entre 
esas dos formas de emprendedurismo y presenta un marco para un abordaje más sistemático y eficaz del proceso 
emprendedor. Exploramos las implicaciones de este análisis de emprendedurismo social tanto para sus practicantes 
como para sus investigadores.
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